Publication

Secure Your Hardware with Randomization and Redundancy

Sumeet Upadhya, Dennis Cao, and Joseph Khamisy. Advised by Hoeseok Yang and Younghyun Cho.

AES-128 is mathematically sound, but the hardware running it isn't. By deliberately glitching a microcontroller's power or clock while it encrypts, an attacker can induce faults that leak information about the secret key. This thesis implements AES-128 on a microcontroller, reproduces those fault-injection attacks with a ChipWhisperer, and shows that combining randomized execution with triple modular redundancy sharply reduces the number of faulty outputs an attacker can exploit.

Published in the Computer Science and Engineering Senior Theses collection at Santa Clara University's Scholar Commons.

Read the thesis on Scholar Commons

Related: the Secure Your Hardware project entry.